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M O N E T A R Y - P O L I C Y T A R G E T I N G I N T H E C E N T R A L 
E U R O P E A N T R A N S I T I O N E C O N O M I E S 
Lucjan T. Orlbwski 
This chapter examines the monetary-policy-targeting systems, in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s (until 1998), of three Central European EU-accession 
candidates—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Polahd-^-and advocates the 
potential benefits of applying a direct-inflation-targeting (DIT) system in 
them. For the purpose of the analysis presented here, DIT is defined as "a 
monetary policy framework that is based on the assumption of long-term 
price stability as the official policy goal and on the designation of the official 
inflation forecast as intermediate policy target" (Orlowski, 2000). Section 
1 is a brief overview of monetary-targeting practices in the Czech Republic 
Hungary, and Poland. It is followed, in Section 2, by an argument in favor 
of forward-looking monetary-policy rules. Section 3 presents a theoretical 
examination of DIT. Based on this examination, in Section 4 a model of 
inflation targeting for the transition economies is offered. The analysis in 
this section returns to an empirical examination of the basic rules, followed 
by an assessment of the early results of the Czech Republic's core-inflation 
targeting since the beginning of 1998. A synthesis and additional policy rec-
ommendations are presented in Section 5. 
12.1. A REVIEW OF MONETARY-TARGETING PRACTICES 
BEFORE 1998 
?n 
Before the economic reforms of the early 1990s, monetary.policy played 
no active role in Central Europe. Competitive banking was nonexistent 
in the centrally planned economies. The socialist economy was serviced 
by a mono-bank, which facilitated the payments of centrally determined 
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transactions. The monetary system was based on two separate circuits: 
(i) cash payments made by households for consumer goods and services 
and cash payments made by enterprises for wages; and (ii) payments 
made by enterprises through their bank accounts. The domestic curren-
cy was practically nonconvertible on both current-account and capital-
account transactions. Monetary authorities planned the money supply to 
accommodate the credit plans that assigned funds to enterprises. 
One of the prime tasks of postcommunist economic reformers was to 
establish the foundations for building modern monetary policies. 
Reforms began with the breakup of the mono-bank system into a central 
bank and several commercial banks. At an early stage in the reform 
process, the budding financial markets were gradually deregulated, and 
currencies were declared partially convertible on current-account trans-
actions. 
At the outset of the transition, central banks had no proven record of 
credibility and no available indirect-monetary-policy instruments. The 
lack of competition in financial markets and high, volatile inflation dis-
torted market interest rates. The logical way to start the process of mon-
etary stability and build competitive financial markets was to apply a cur-
rency peg, which served as both an intermediate policy target and a dis-
ciplinary tool. Under the fixed-exchange-rate system, the money supply 
became endogenous; thus allowing central banks to control only domes-
tic components of the monetary base. With exchange-rate-based mone-
tary policy, central banks could establish some initial credibility by "bor-
rowing it from abroad." 
This approach was crucial for reducing the corrective inflation that 
stemmed from the deregulation of prices set previously at low "ceiling" 
levels and, subsequently, for reducing the indexation of wages and prices 
as well as government expenditures. Although the magnitude of the cor-
rective inflation varied among the Central European economies, from 
hyperinflation levels in Poland, in 1989-90, to moderate inflation in 
Hungary, the wave of corrective inflation along with the lack of a proven 
record of fiscal and monetary credibility introduced a culture of pro-
nounced adaptive-inflation expectations and backward-looking indexa-
tion. The danger of high-inflation expectations impelled the new, inex-
perienced monetary authorities to monitor various price indexes and to 
actively counteract any recorded upswings in inflation. 
The culture of discretionary reactions to any observed inflationary 
pressures was still a force in central-bank thinking in the late 1990s. 
Backward-looking discretionary policies were pervasive, despite a sub-
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stantial expansion in the availability of monetary-policy tools and 
modifications in targeting practices. Because of the significant institu-
tional development of financial markets and competitive banking, cen-
tral banks in the transition economies could already make use of modern 
indirect monetary-policy instruments (Fink, Haiss, Orlowski, and 
Salvatore 1998). At the same time, they gained some credibility by reduc-
ing inflation. These advancements allowed monetary authorities to depart 
from fixed exchange fates and introduce "money-based" monetary poli-
cies that centered on targeting either interest rates or monetary aggregates. 
Despite all the accomplishments, the central banks continued the prac-
tice of discretionary backward-looking reactions, which do not allow for 
sufficient decision lags necessary to make prudent judgments on-whether 
a surge in inflation has a temporary (that is, self-correcting) or perma-
nent character. The inconsistency of monetary-targeting practices and the 
active sterilization of capital inflows, in 1994-97, confirm that a highly 
discretionary approach to monetary policies was practiced in the Central 
European states. 
In their annual reports and policy guidelines, the central banks of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were uniform in their ultimate 
goals (price stability) but differed substantially in their intermediate and 
operating targets (Krzak and Schubert 1997). Disinflation and stable 
exchange fates became long-term policy objectives in all three. But the 
National Bank of Hungary (NBH) paid relatively more attention to "exter-
nal currency stability" than the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and the 
Czech National Bank (CNB). As a supplementary but ultimate goal, both 
the CNB and the NBP declared their intention to support the economic 
policies of their governments—a vague policy statement that should be 
interpreted with caution. 
All. three countries have designed and implemented various strategies 
that depart from the strict exchange-rate targeting applied at the beginning 
of the 1990s (Orlowski 1997). Poland abolished the fixed zloty-to-dollar 
peg in May 1991, after maintaining it for 16 months. At first the NBP 
replaced it with an adjustable peg and later with a crawling band that was 
introduced in May 1995, after widening the band of permitted fluctuations 
of the zloty against a five-currency basket (the dollar, the D-mark, the 
British pound, the French frank, and the Swissffank). The Czech Republic 
maintained a pegged koruna to a basket of two currencies (the D-mark and 
the dollar) until the end of February 1996, when it enacted an adjustable 
band. After speculative attacks against the koruna, in May 1997, the CNB 
switched to a managed float. Hungary pursued an adjustable peg with a 
ttd 
n 
ion 
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narrow band, between January 1990 and March 1995, after which the 
fofint was devalued and a crawling peg was introduced. 
The intermediate and operating targets of the analyzed central banks 
varied significantly. At the end of February 1996 and until the close of 
1997, the CNB assumed controlling the growth of M2 balances as its 
intermediate target, after an expansion of the band of permitted curren-
cy fluctuations was set at plus-or-minus 7.5 percent. The corresponding 
operating target was the one-month Prague Interbank Offer Rate (PRI-
BOR) (Krzak and Schubert 1997). Since 1998, the CNB has applied a 
new solution—a core-inflation-targeting system (see below). 
The NBH assumed as its intermediate targets the monitoring of both 
the exchange rate, within a relatively narrow 2.25 percent band on either 
side of parity, and the M2 growth rate. The bank has pursued, conse-
quently, the interest-rate differential vis-a-vis European financial markets 
as its operating target. This approach permits the bank to effectively mon-
itor net capital inflows. 
The NBP claimed controlling broad money and the exchange rate, 
within a wide plus-or-minus 10 percent band (without publishing inter-
nal target zones), as its intermediate targets. There was a considerable 
degree of inconsistency in the choice of operational targets, too. 
Specifically, the bank targeted short-term interest rates in the first half of 
1996 and domestic-credit expansion in the second half of 1996, when the 
GDP growth rate accelerated and the current-account deficit deteriorat-
ed. In 1997, it announced it was targeting the monetary base, and in 1998 
it switched again to targeting interest rates. 
The main reason for applying interest-rate targeting, as stated by the 
NBP, was out of a need to contain the rapid and volatile rate of credit 
expansion, induced by the sharp economic recovery and the increasing 
level of financial intermediation (initially much lower than in the Czech 
Republic). This forced the NBP to act with discretion, frequently reset-
ting the interest-rate target. Hungary experienced similar problems with 
low financial intermediation and fast-growing broad money. 
As seen in Table 12.1, the growth of M2 in Poland, in 1995-97, ran 
well above the rate of inflation, despite very high real interest rates. The 
growth of M2 balances in Hungary was also strong, accompanied by high 
real interest rates. Only the Czech Republic experienced a significant 
slowing in M2 growth. Czech real interest rates rose sharply in 1995—97, 
particularly after the fixed-exchange-rate system was abandoned at the 
end of February 1996 and, subsequently, after a real appreciation of the 
Czech koruna decelerated. As a result, the large capital inflows that pro-
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voked various problems for the country in 1993—95, significantly retreat-
ed in 1996 and 1997 (Orlowski and Corrigan 1997). The Czech Republic 
has already reached a high level of financial intermediation, in compar-
ison with Hungary and Poland. This is implied by its higher M2-to-GDP 
ratio than that in Hungary or in Poland. 
Table 12.1. Selected Monetary Indicators in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland 
Monetary Indicators 
CPI Inflation 
M2-to-GDP ratio 
M2 growth rate 
REER* 
3-month T-bill rate 
Czech Republic 
1995 1996 1997 1995 
9.0 8.8 8.5 283 
0.87 0.82 0;76 0.42 
29.3 6.4 1.6 18.4 
135.3 142.7 144.3 106.2 
11.0 13.0 15.5 32.6 
Hungary 
1996 1997 
23.5 18.3 
0.42 0.42 
20.8 23.2 
109.4 121.3 
27.3 22.0 
Poland 
1995 1996 
27.9 19.9 
0.37 0.38 
35.1 29.2 
137.9 143.6 
25.6 20.3 
1997 
14.4 
0.41 
30.6 ' 
147.7 
24.3 
Notes: REER* is the real effective exchange rate, compiled by J. P. Morgan, based on consumer 
prices; January 1990 = 100. The quoted 3-month T-bill rate is the end-of-period rate. 
Source: IMFTFS, various issues; Morgan Guaranty Trust Company: World Financial Markets, 
March 27, 1998: 52; CNB, NBH, and NBP monthly reports, various issues. 
The Hungarian and Polish interest-rate-targeting systems had addi-
tional flaws. They neutralized the monetarist link between the money sup-
ply and inflation; thus making inflation more difficult to forecast. Interest-
rate targeting contributed to the instability of the income elasticity of the 
demand for money in these countries, because in an environment of high, 
targeted interest rates, the growth of M2 is highly unpredictable and 
uncontrollable. 
The unstable income elasticity of the demand for money inhibits an 
accurate determination of a desirable range of M2 growth, and it may 
induce large deviations of actual M2 money balances, from the target 
range. Consequently, highly unpredictable growth rates of money bal-
ances may present a risk factor to the indexation of wages and prices, con-
tributing further to inflationary pressures. As shown by Poole (1970), the 
targeting of interest rates proves to be a better policy choice only when 
money-market shocks (LM shocks) are more significant than the shocks 
in aggregate demand (IS shocks). Adversely, if aggregate-demand shocks 
prevail, a money-growth target is a better policy, since its impact on 
income is less destabilizing. It is difficult to determine what type of 
shocks prevailed in Central Europe in the second half of 1990s. But con-
sidering that the fast expansion of aggregate demand was accelerated by 
large inflows of foreign-direct investment, the real-economy shocks seem 
m 
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to have prevailed over the money-market shocks. Under such conditions, 
the Poole (1970) model would suggest setting money targets rather than 
interest-rate targets. 
The frequent resetting of interest-rate targets contributed to the poor 
transparency of monetary policies in Poland and in Hungary. Moreover, 
it exacerbated already excessively high market interest rates. The large, 
positive differentials between their domestic interest rates and the corre-
sponding rates in leading international financial markets were a major 
source of large capital inflows. Table 12.1 shows that Poland had the high-
est positive real interest rates at the close of 1997. This situation stemmed 
from a successful disinflation coupled with high interest-rate targets, 
resulting from the implementation of a tight monetary policy. High real 
interest rates, in turn, increased the attractiveness of Polish fixed-income 
securities and time deposits not only to investors and to speculators but 
also to Polish exporters engaged in money-market hedging of export 
receivables.1 
The frequent resetting of interest-rate targets in the transition 
economies inhibits monetary-policy credibility because these small, open 
economies are becoming increasingly dependent on the conditions in glob-
al financial markets. As a result, their exogenous domestic interest rates 
require frequent reactions to changes in international interest rates. The 
high dependency of domestic monetary policy on global financial markets 
proves that the policy is neither fully autonomous nor highly credible. 
12.2. FORWARD-LOOKING VERSUS BACKWARD-LOOKING 
MONETARY POLICIES 
Interest-rate targeting has been a dominant practice in the countries exam-
ined Tiere. Until the end of 1997, all three central banks utilized a dis-
cretionary approach to monetary policy rather than a rule-based one. 
The central banks would be better off abandoning the current practice 
of interest-rate targeting and considering a DIT system instead (Orlowski 
1998). To prepare the Central European's monetary systems for acces-
sion to the EU and EMU, fewer discretionary policies are more desirable 
than backward-looking policies. A forward-looking monetary policy 
would affirm the monetary authorities' commitment to disinflation. In 
addition, it would aid the transition economies' central banks in fulfilling 
several key objectives while developing modern, efficient central-bank-
ing practices. 
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Several strategies can be suggested to the transition economies' cen-
tral banks to make their monetary policies more compatible with EU poli-
cies. Establishing a proven, solid record of policy credibility should 
remain their primary objective. At a minimum, credibility can be achieved 
through a successful disinflation and through the stability of interest rates 
and market exchange rates; thus, ultimately, through the stability of finan-
cial markets. Disinflation is required for reducing the real appreciation 
of the Central European currencies and, subsequently, for diminishing the 
danger of excessive current-account deficits along with the risk of large 
short-term capital inflows. The central banks' credibility will be enhanced 
further by a higher degree of monetary^policy predictability: they need 
to develop forward-looking policies based on preannounced rules . ' 
Improving the transparency of central-bank actions can be best accom-
plished by developing and publishing a set of feedback rules and policy 
guidelines, thereby allowing for optimal recognition and decision lags. 
These lags would allow for sufficient time for recognizing economic dis-
turbances, forjudging whether they are temporary or permanent, and for 
making the appropriate decisions about policy responses. Experienced, 
credible central bankers always exercise patience in their policy reactions 
to observed disturbances. They do not instantly react to price shocks and 
other disturbances in monetary variables because such disturbances may 
likely be self-correcting, presenting no permanent danger to economic sta-
bility. Predetermined recognition and decision lags are also necessary in 
order to account for delayed responses between prices, interest rates, 
exchange rates, and money balances. 
A central bank needs to explain all of these lags to the public and to 
other branches of government so that all understand why the bank, in case 
of a temporary departure of monetary variables from the targeted level, 
elects not to undertake corrective actions. In order to establish a pattern 
of effective communications, the central bank needs to set guidelines for 
explaining to the public why it is silent in the face of some observed dis-
turbances. In addition to the benefits noted above, a patient, less discre-
tionary approach to monetary policy involves lower economic costs to 
government and the private sector. Specifically, if thefe are large capital 
inflows that are believed to be only temporary, a central bank may elect 
not to sterilize them; thus avoiding the high fiscal costs of sterilization. 
In addition, a horidiscretionary approach to monetary policy may lead to 
lower reserves (as a percentage of deposits) held by commercial banks, 
which benefits the expansion of domestic credit. In contrast, less-trans-
parent discretionary policies will prompt banks to hold more reserves for 
id 
in 
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precautionary reasons so that they are able to hedge the uncertainty of 
future corrective actions by the central bank. 
Forward-looking policies are also favorable for incorporating various 
impact lags of changes in the money supply on inflation. Their length 
varies among different monetary-transmission channels (Svensson 
1997b). The aggregate-demand channel has a long adjustment period. 
Specifically, monetary tightening results in higher interest rates, which 
in turn reduce investment and consumption, stimulating a downward pres-
sure on prices over a relatively long period of time. The channel of ratio-
nal inflation expectations has a shorter impact lag. A monetary contrac-
tion diminishes inflation expectations, and if the policy is credible, it 
results in downward pressure on wages and prices. The effect of lower 
wages may not occur if the policy credibility is low. The exchange-rate 
channel has the shortest impact lag. Monetary tightening leads to a real 
appreciation of the domestic currency and lower import prices, which 
contribute relatively quickly to lower domestic inflation. While pursuing 
a forward-looking monetary policy, central bankers need to identify which 
one of the three transmission channels prevails in order to estimate when 
the targeted level of low inflation is likely to be reached. 
More-transparent monetary policies in the Central European 
economies are likely to alleviate the problem of asymmetric information 
between central banks and financial institutions. Under a discretionary 
monetary policy, central banks tend to act without preannouncements. 
They do not fully disclose information about the current condition of their 
monetary policies and their possible responses to changes in monetary 
variables. If central banks develop clear rules and guidelines for their 
actions and set forward-oriented policy targets, the information gap 
between the monetary authorities and banks will narrow, and financial 
systems will be less susceptible to destabilizing shocks. 
Furthermore, the transition economies' central banks need to enhance 
their accountability for policy decisions. This can be accomplished by 
more extensive disclosure of information about the current condition of 
monetary variables and about conditions in financial markets as perceived 
by central banks. Such disclosure, coupled with the increased responsi-
bility of policymakers for their actions to the public, may play an impor-
tant role in educating households and small businesses, which possess lit-
tle experience and understanding of the problems of macroeconomic sta-
bility and modern financial markets. 
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12.3. THE ADVANTAGES OF DIRECT INFLATION TARGETING 
(DIT) 
In the recent literature on monetary-policy targeting, DIT has won strong 
support (Spaventa 1996; Wyplosz 1997; Krzak and Schubert 1997; Fischer 
1997; Mishkin 1997; Mishkin and Posen 1997; Bernanke, Laubach, 
Mishkin and Posen 1999; and Svensson 1996, 1997a, and 1997b, 1999). 
Most of the authors arrive at the general conclusion that DIT, as a less dis-
cretionary, rules-based policy, emphasizes the central bank's commitment 
to disinflation and helps in its attempts to,gain credibility. As a forward-
looking policy, DIT is likely to have a stabilizing impact on financial mar-
kets. * - '• 
The theoretical literature is supported by the generally successful 
experiences of various monetary authorities that have practiced some 
form of DIT and lowered inflation, namely, the central banks of New 
'Zealand, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and the United 
Kingdom (Mishkin and Posen 1997; Svensson 1997b; Frowen and Kara 
kitos 1997; Nadal de Simone 1998; Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and 
Posen 1999). 
Cecchetti (1996) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1996) express some reser-
vations about DIT. They argue that nominal-income-targeting rules are 
superior to price-targeting rules, because when the growth of nominal 
income and employment is the ultimate policy target, the move to a low 
inflation as ah intermediate target may have a destabilizing impact on out-
put. Some prominent policymakers have voiced additional concerns about 
DIT. Specifically, the European Central Bank president, Wim Duisenberg, 
opposed the system, in 19.97, on the grounds that it is a "lookrat-every-
thing" approach to monetary-policy procedures (see Krzak and Schubert 
1997: 33). Nevertheless, the arguments in favor of DIT are forceful and 
convincing. This approach has been successful in bringing inflation to 
low, sustainable levels and reducing the instability of monetary aggre-
gates. 
DIT has at least two distinctive advantages, which are consistent with 
the major objectives of the economic transition, and which apply main-
ly to the more advanced Central European economies that have devel-
oped fairly competitive financial institutions and markets [Orlowski 
2000]. The first advantage of DIT is its forward-looking character. This 
forward-looking inflation forecast, as the official policy target, will enable 
central banks to retreat from discretionary, backward-looking policy 
adjustments. This, in turn, will allow them to improve transparency and, 
on 
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ultimately, credibility of monetary policy. The second merit of DIT is also 
related to its forward-looking character. Once an initial credibility is 
established, the official forecast of low, sustainable inflation may gear the 
mechanisms of nominal indexation to lower price deflators and, conse-
quently, benefit the disinflation process. In addition, a constrained dis-
cretion along with indexation geared to lower price expectations is like-
ly to diminish the volatility of prices, interest rates and exchange rates 
that has been quite significant in TEs so far. 
There are two extreme forms of DIT. In one extreme form a central 
bank may apply strict inflation targeting (SIT), with a narrow tolerance 
band of deviation of actual inflation from the midpoint target. A narrow 
band implies that the policy-decision lag is short and that the monetary 
policy is subject to frequent corrections and resettings. This is a discre-
tionary policy that also restrains the flexibility of exchange rates. The pol-
icy utilizes, mainly, the exchange-rate channel because of its short impact 
lag. Thus it is often implemented by adjusting market exchange rates 
through active interventions in foreign-exchange markets. This policy 
implementation can be accomplished alternatively by adjusting the rate 
of the crawling devaluation or by changing the spread between the rates 
of required reserves on domestic- and foreign-currency deposits. Because 
of the shorter decision lag and the active interference with market 
exchange rates, SIT may result in the instability of money-market vari-
ables, preventing the exchange rate from corresponding to interest-rate 
differentials. SIT is seldom applied in practice because it does not gen-
erate the attractive features of expanded monetary flexibility. 
Flexible inflation targeting (FIT) is the other extreme form of DIT. 
It is based on a wide tolerance band, which allows more time for the pol-
icy decision lag, necessary for proper judgment on whether the observed 
inflationary shock is temporary, that is, self-correcting, or more perma-
nent.'Wider bands restrain discretionary-policy reactions and reduce the 
frequency of target resetting; thus making the policy more predictable and 
transparent. They also allow central banks to expand the time horizon of 
their intermediate targets and focus on long-term disinflation goals. Thus 
the policy becomes forward looking. This may contribute to lower 
inflation expectations and to a weakening indexation of wages and prices. 
A wider tolerance band corresponds directly to more-flexible exchange 
rates. For instance, the broader margin of the permitted currency depre-
ciation is consistent with a larger departure of actual inflation from the 
target level. Therefore, the application of FIT requires the expanded flexi-
bility of exchange rates. As a result, by increasing the currency risk of 
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speculators, more-flexible exchange rates may improve the risk structure 
of net foreign-capital inflows, that is, the excess of foreign-direct and 
long-term portfolio investments over short-term portfolio investments. As 
opposed to .SIT, the FIT framework allows for a higher degree of output 
variability, corresponding to the width of the tolerance band (Svensson, 
1999). To be effective, the system requires well-defined policy rules and 
guidelines based on more complex inflation models. 
12.4. A MODEL OF DIRECT INFLATION TARGETING FOR 
CENTRAL EUROPE 
DIT is an attractive policy alternative for the Central European 
economies, which may help them overcome the present deficiencies of 
their macroeconomic policies, enhance the credibility of their central 
banks, and strengthen their commitment to disinflation. And it could facil-
itate their preparations for EU and EMU accession. But .several condi-
tions must be met to make the DIT regime successful. 
First, maintaining fiscal discipline plays the crucial role in a success^ 
ful disinflation. In Poland, for example, the continuation of economic 
growth would have to be combined with a considerably tighter fiscal 
stance than what is required by the Maastricht Treaty (a maximum 3 per-
cent budget-deficit to GDP ratio), in order to stem inflation to a low, sus-
tainable level. Fiscal discipline in Poland is imperative for DIT, and it is 
needed even more in Hungary. Its inflation was the highest among the 
three examined economies, and its 1997 fiscal deficit reached 4.1 percent 
of GDP (excluding privatization revenues). Poland and the Czech 
Republic maintained better fiscal positions in that year, with budget 
deficits reaching 1.4 and 1 percent of GDP, respectively.2 
The choice of a tolerance band is critical in designing a DIT policy. 
In the early stages of their disinflation programs, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland might consider applying a relatively narrow band 
until inflation is brought to a low, sustainable level. A narrow band would 
indicate that the central banks are firmly committed to disinflation. It 
would also enhance exchange-rate and interest-rate stability._Both are usu-
ally volatile when actual annual inflation persists at double-digit, rates. 
The band ought to be wide enough, however, to allow for sufficient recog-
nition and decision' lags. It seems that the initial bands in these three 
economies could be set at plus-or-minus one percent around the inter-
mediate-inflation target. 
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Feasibility studies for the possible introduction of DIT in Central 
Europe ought to identify the inflation indexes, which are selected as tar-
get variables. Moreover, these studies should determine whether items 
that are subject to administrative price controls should be included in the 
price basket. Another pertinent issue that needs to be resolved prior to 
any DIT implementation is the determination of the maximum permitted 
duration of any nonaction, that is, the lack of any policy response to a 
shock that is believed to be only temporary. In practical terms, this implies 
a maximum-allowed time of actual inflation running above the upper limit 
of the. tolerance band. The central banks' credibility might be significant-
ly damaged if they delay responding to any inflation overshooting the 
band for an excessive period of time. 
Central banks pursuing DIT need to develop complex, nonmonetarist 
models of inflation in order to be able to rationally determine a mid-
point-inflation target and the width of the tolerance band. There is no 
uniform model that can be rationally applied to both industrial and 
emerging-market economies. Since interest rates and exchange rates in 
the transition economies are highly exogenous, they are influenced by 
conditions in global financial markets. Inflation forecasts in these coun-
tries, as a result, must account for both domestic and international mon-
etary conditions. Because of the high uncertainty of external conditions, 
the tolerance bands of permitted departures of actual inflation from the 
midpoint target should be relatively wide. A central bank Ought to pos-
sess the legal right not to respond to significant exogenous inflation 
shocks that have only a temporary impact on the domestic economy.. 
Another key issue that needs to be resolved is whether the responsi-
bility for setting the inflation target will reside with the central bank, the 
ministry of finance, or an economic council of the government. Normally 
central-bank autonomy is better protected when the bank is granted the 
exclusive" right to make such decisions. In such a case, the bank assumes 
sole responsibility for lowering inflation. But this approach may not be 
desirable in small, open economies where the responsibility for price sta-
bility ought to be equally shared by fiscal authorities. It is advisable that 
the ministry of finance and the central bank jointly determine official 
inflation targets. This would allow the central bank to focus its actions 
on reducing the volatility of inflation and the instability of other mone-
tary variables. 
The monitoring of adherence to inflation targets is routinely conduct-
ed by independent research institutions, in addition to the central bank. 
Such an approach strengthens monetary discipline and improves the cen-
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tral bank's accountability to the public. Moreover, it may prove helpful 
in winning public confidence and gathering public support for monetary 
policies. 
id 
Figure 12.1. A Model of DIT in the Transition Economies at Different Stages in the 
EU-Accession Process 
Figure 12.1 presents a model of inflation targets and tolerance bands 
•at various stages of disinflation and in preparation for EU membership. 
The model assumes that at the beginning" of the road to EU membership, 
at time t0, there is high, double-digit inflation that is by far too excessive 
for successful integration. Such high inflation disqualifies the candidates 
from locking their exchange rates to the euro. Thus disinflation becomes 
a top priority and the ultimate goal of monetary convergence. DIT is 
expected to successfully facilitate the process of disinflation. Subsequently 
the candidates will apply more-flexible exchange rates, until they begin 
active preparations for EMU accession. 
Monetary policy adjustments are divided into three stages. Stage I, 
corresponding to the period t0tj, reflects active disinflation from the cur-
rent high level P0. The initial tolerance band at this stage is reasonably 
narrow (plus-or-minus one percent), in order to reaffirm the commitment 
of a central bank to disinflation and alleviate the problem"of "instrument 
instability" (see above). 
When the lower limit of the tolerance band reaches the predetermined 
inflation level Pt, the scope of permitted deviations from the midpoint tar-
an 
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get may be expanded. This would allow monetary authorities to take 
advantage of the benefits of FIT. Pt may be viewed as a desirable level 
of inflation upon actual EU accession. In practical terms, if P is set at 5 
percent, the corresponding midpoint inflation target at time tj will be 6 
percent. This situation determines the actual timing of tv Although it may 
be difficult to estimate the timing in advance because it will likely depend 
on how successful the disinflation process is, it is recommended that cen-
tral banks arrive at an approximation of t r By doing this and by announc-
ing the tj estimate in advance, the banks would demonstrate their firm 
commitment to both monetary discipline and disinflation. It is impera-
tive that fiscal authorities equally engage in setting the inflation target for 
the period tj, to ensure that fiscal discipline is maintained. Considering 
the different levels of actual inflation and the various degrees of price and 
wage indexation in the transition economies, the actual timing oft, seems 
to be less remote for the Czech Republic than for Hungary and Poland. 
The entrants would be well advised to expand the inflation-tolerance 
band during the second stage of adjustments, in the period tjtj. Time t2 
denotes the moment of accession to the EU and the concurrent entry into 
the ERM II—the exchange-rate mechanism for EU members remaining 
outside the EMU. The Central European candidates are expected to join 
the ERM II and to lock in their exchange rates to the euro once they 
become official EU members. Prior to that moment, they may opt for FIT. 
The wider tolerance band in the second stage of adjustments is fully con-
sistent with expanded exchange-rate flexibility. An important advantage 
of FIT would be the expanded uncertainty of exchange-rate fluctuations, 
which might ease expectations of the real appreciation of the domestic 
currency. Ultimately, more-flexible exchange rates are likely to defend 
current-account positions and rationalize the risk structure of capital 
inflows. 
The final and third stage of the monetary-policy adjustment, repre-
sented by the period t2t3, is consistent with a "post-EU-accession" strat-
egy, which will focus on preparations for entry into the EMU. At time t2, 
a new EU member will begin preparations for entering the EMU by join-
ing the ERM II. In the following period, the monetary-policy targeting 
would have to gradually change from DIT to the euro-peg. Monetary-pol-
icy adjustments in this period can be labeled as a "return-to-peg" strate-
gy—as the economic transition in Central Europe began from the cur-
rency peg and will end with the peg to the euro—while experiencing a 
gradual expansion of monetary flexibility when going from one to the 
other (Orlowski 1998). 
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At this third stage, the inflation-tolerance band will be gradually nar-
rowed to ensure a smooth convergence to the irrevocable peg to the euro. 
Time t3 denotes the moment of feasible entry into the EMU. The rate of 
inflation Pn corresponding to the time t3 of entry to the EMU is consis-
tent with the Maastricht Treaty benchmark of monetary convergence (the 
actual inflation in the candidate country is not to exceed 1.5 percent of 
the average of the three member states with the lowest inflation). 
One of the most critical tasks in each stage of inflation, targeting will 
be to determine the optimal time horizon of the intermediate target. It 
seems rational that a shorter time horizon of the intermediate target is 
applied at the first stage. The initial period of limited flexibility of inflation 
targeting, coupled with more aggressive disinflation, involves-a higher 
risk of departures from the target. The central banks may want to expe-
dite tighter control over adherence to the intermediate target by more fre-
quently resetting it. This horizon can be expanded in the second phase of 
increased flexibility of monetary policy. 
id 
12.5. CORE-INFLATION-TARGETING IN THE CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
In January 1998, the CNB introduced DIT, following earlier practice with 
other nominal anchors: an adjustable peg and, after February 1996, an 
adjustable band. With the introduction of a managed float, in May 1997, 
this disciplinary-policy tool was gone. Until the end of 1997, the bank 
sought to apply money-stock targeting, but the growth of monetary aggre-
gates exceeded the targeted range. Given the circumstances, in January 
1998 the CNB decided to introduce DIT as a policy-disciplining instru-
ment. 
The new strategy, implemented in 1998—2000, called for a 4.5 percent 
net annual-inflation target at year-end 2000, with a tolerance band of plus-
or-minus one percent. The 1998 net inflation target was set at 6 percent, 
with a narrower tolerance band of plus-or-minus 0.5 percent, The CNB 
chose to target only the part of inflation that was believed to be effec-
tively influenced by monetary policy. Net inflation excluded regulated 
price items in the consumer-price-index basket, which accounted for 18 
percent (136 items) of all 754 items in the Czech CPI basket. Hence net 
inflation represented the movement of the remaining prices in the CPI bas-
ket. Excluded were those items whose prices were set directly by the cen-
tral and local governments (rents, electricity, gas, railway transportation, 
la 
ion 
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and the like), items with imposed price limits (education services, hous-
ing, heating, bus transportation, and the like), and items with adminis-
tratively set fees. 
Although the intention of targeting unregulated prices whose move-
ments depend-on monetary-policy conditions may seem fundamentally 
correct, the approach is questionable because regulated prices strongly 
influence the costs of production. Consequently, they have a strong indi-
rect impact on unregulated prices with a relatively short time lag. In fact, 
the CNB reported that net inflation was running high in January and 
February 1998 because of the indirect effects of increases in administra-
tively feglilated prices and indirect taxes applied at the beginning of the 
year. Nevertheless, monthly changes in net inflation in the first quarter 
of 1998 yielded encouraging results. Monthly net inflation rates gradu-
ally declined from 1.5 percent in January, to 0.7 percent in February, and 
to a mere 0.1 percent in March (CNB March 1998). 
As of mid-1998, it was still unclear whether Czech DIT was effectively 
fulfilling its disciplining function. The policy was applied at the outset 
of high CPI inflation, exceeding an annual rate of 13 percent in the first 
quarter of 1998. Because this surge in inflation was induced by 
significant adjustments in administrative prices—indirect taxes and 
fees—the introduction of DIT has cast it share of doubts. Some financial 
analysts proclaimed* the new policy premature, and financial markets 
exerted some pressures on the koruna's nominal depreciation, in the first 
quarter of 1998. Toward the end of 1998, CNB, still recovering from the 
financial crisis of 1997—1998, applied a very tight monetary policy that 
helped reduce net inflation to 1.7 percent in December, wellljelow the 
lower bound of the official target set at 5.5 percent. A similar situation 
reoccurred in 1999 when the year-end net inflation fell to 0.2 percent, 
significantly below the lower bound of the tolerance band of 4.0 percent. 
The narrow width of the tolerance band could also be questioned. It 
was rather a SIT system that favored discretionary policy reactions to 
observed departures of actual inflation from the target band, not war-
ranting a sufficient decision lag. On the positive side, a one-year time 
horizon for the intermediate target seemed to be justifiable because it 
guaranteed that the target would not be frequently reset and that 
disinflation would be consistently pursued. 
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12.6. A SYNTHESIS 
The analysis here implies that DIT is a desirable and beneficial choice 
for the Central European transition economies. This policy approach will 
help overcome the deficiencies of monetary policies in the region, name-
ly, the backward-looking approach, the excessive discretion, the short 
time horizons of intermediate targets, and the focus on interest rates as 
operating targets. 
The proposed DIT is a forward-looking approach. It is consistent with 
more-flexible exchange rates, which relinquish the disciplinary function 
of the initial currency peg. Implicit-inflation targets may thus assume the 
disciplinary role of the policy. _. , 
Cooperation between central banks, ministries of finance, and gov-
ernment agencies is critical to the overall success of disinflationpolicies. 
For this reason, DIT may contribute to a unified commitment to 
disinflation of all government branches not merely central banks. In con-
trast, the interest-rate-targeting system is not necessarily favorable for 
coordinating the actions of the entire government toward price stability. 
DIT is likely to assist the transition economies in preparing for EU 
and EMU accession. As emphasized by Spaventa (1996),. a coordinated 
inflation targeting among the members of the EMU and those outside the 
monetary union—both the EU members and the candidates—may prove 
better and more effective than exchange-rate pegging at stabilizing 
exchange rates and prices in the entire European system. 
The analyzed countries should not be deterred if early DIT results are 
unfavorable. In the early stage of the new system's implementation, 
inflation may not be successfully reduced for a variety of reasons, such 
as administrative price increases (the case of the Czech Republic in the 
first quarter of 1998) or the contagion effects of competitive devaluations 
in the emerging-market economies. But in the long run, DIT may bring 
a number of advantages to stabilization efforts, including monetary-pol-
icy credibility, transparency, predictability, and accountability. It appears 
to be a viable policy alternative for achieving the monetary-stability con-
ditions that are essential to the transition economies' full integfation into 
the EU. 
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NOTES 
1 A Polish exporter who signed a DM. 1 million export contract with a German importer 
in November 1997, with the transfer of receivables scheduled for March 1998,-could 
generate PLN 2,112,186 in revenue from a money-market hedge. The hedging oppor-
tunity worked as follows: DM 1,000,000 x 171.0233 was borrowed in November from 
a German bank (at the annual credit rate of 7 percent), converted into Polish zlotys at 
the November exchange rate of 2.02 zlotys per DM 1, and invested at a Polish .bank 
for four months at the annual rate of 21 percent. By comparison, the unhedged trans-
action would yield 1,800,000 zlotys at the March spot exchange rate of 1.80, and the 
transaction hedged with a four-months-forward rate of 2.08 would generate 2,080,000 
zlotys. The money-market hedge was more beneficial due to high Polish interest rates 
and provided the incentive to immediately swap any export receivables into Polish zlo-
tys. 
2 The GDP and fiscal indicators presented here are based on statistics from the Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies. 
